Gold Oil Land Development Corporation, A Corporation v. Steven C. Davis And Kristi Ann Davis, His Wife, Wade R. Davis And Hrs. Wade Davis, His Wife, And Leo M.Bertagnole, A Single Man : Brief of Appellant Steven C. Davis by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Gold Oil Land Development Corporation, A
Corporation v. Steven C. Davis And Kristi Ann
Davis, His Wife, Wade R. Davis And Hrs. Wade
Davis, His Wife, And Leo M.Bertagnole, A Single
Man : Brief of Appellant Steven C. Davis
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Carolyn L. Driscoll; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
Steven C. DavisWoodrow D. White; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gold Oil Land Dev. V. Davis, No. 16461 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1760
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GOLD OIL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent,) 
vs. 
STEVEN C. DAVIS and KRISTI 
ANN DAVIS, his wife, HADE R. 
DAVIS and HRS. WADE DAVIS, 
his wife, and LEO M. 
BERTAGNOLE, a single man, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants and Appellant.) 
Supreme Court No. 16461 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STEVEN C. DAVIS 
Woodrow D. White 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
Carolyn L. Driscoll 
Nicolaas DeJonge 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant Steven C. 
Davis 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF comrnrs 
Statesent of Facts 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
Relief Sought on Appeal. 
Legal A:-gu_TJ.ent . 
First A:-gu::-.ent - Did the Plaintiff sustain. 
its burden of proof at 
trial? 
1 
5 
6 
6 
6 
Seccr.d Arell2lent - Was there a valid delivery . 23 
Conclus:Lon . . . ·. . 
of the quit-clai~ deed from 
Gold Oil Land Develop~ent 
Corporation to Leo U. 
Bertagnole? 
37 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
B and R Supply Company v. Bringhurst, 
28 Utah 2d442, 503 P. 2d 1216 (1972) 
Branch v. Western Factors, Inc., 
28 Utah 2d 361, 502 P.2d 570 (1970) 
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (1978) 
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 
29 P.2d 355 (1934) 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, 
17 Utah 2d 120, 413 P.2d 807 (1966) 
Dansak v. Deluke, 12 Utah 2d 302, 
366 P.2d 67 (1961) 
Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 
495 P.2d 811 (1972) 
Dyer v. Skaden, 128 Mich. 72, 
26 N.W.2d 712 (1947) 
Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
28 Utah 2d 368, 603 P.2d 137 (1972) 
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 
495 P.2d 28 (1972) 
In Re Hume's Es ta te, 128 Mont. 223, 
272 P.2d 999 (1954) 
Lake v. Hermes Associates, 552 P.2d 126 (1976) 
!leagher v. Uintah Gas Company, 
255 P.2d 989 (1953) 
Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50 (1978) 
Santi v. Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Coopany, 21 Utah 2d 155, 
442 P.2d 921 (1972) 
Page 
21 
24 
26 
31, 32, 33, 
35, 36 
31, 32, 33, 
35, 36 
10, 17 
11, 24 
32 
24 
24 
32 
24, 25 
15 
26 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Skerl v. Hillow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah 474, 
69 P.2d 502--r1937) 
State, by Pai v. Thom, 563 P.2d 983 (1977) 
Stevens v. Gray, 259 P.2d 389 (1953) 
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 163 (1977) 
Takacs v. Takacs, 317 Mich. 72, 26 N .11. 2d 
712~7) 
Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch, 
533 P.2d 888 (1975 
Wood v. Ashby, 253 P. 2d 351 (1952) 
Encyclopedias Cited 
23 American Jurisprudence 2d 
26 Corpus Juris Secundum 
31 Corpus Juris Secundum 
32 Corpus Juris Secundum 
Treatises Cited 
The Handbook Law of Evidence, McCormick 
Powell on Real Property 
Real Property, Tiffany 
Restatement of Agencv 2d 
Thompson on Real Property 
24, 25 
32 
13 
26 
32 
22, 24 
15 
28, 29, 30, 
31, 32, 33 
27, 23, 31 
9 
13 
12 
28 
15 
20 
30 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAII 
GOLD OIL LAUD DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent,) 
vs. 
STEVEN C. DAVIS and KR·ISTI 
Alm DAVIS, his wife, WADE R. 
DAVIS and MRS. WADE DAVIS, 
his wife, and LEO M. 
BERTAG!lOLE, a single man, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants and Appellant.) 
Supreme Court No. 16461 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STEVEN C. DAVIS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early 1977, Steven C. Davis became associated with 
Gold Oil Land Development Corporation, plaintiff-respondent 
herein (hereinafter referred to as "Gold"), a business enter-
prise concerned with the promotion and development of real 
property located in Utah County. 
Defendant-Appellant Davis' involvement with Gold was 
precipitated by his acquaintance with Verdi R. White, Sr., 
chairman of the board of Gold. 
During the period of his involvement with Gold, 
including the period encompassed by this cause of action, 
defendant-appellant Davis' activities were directed toward 
the prevention and resolution of disagreements with Gold 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and purchasers of the property in Utah County in which Gold 
had acquired an option interest and securing other purchasers 
for the remaining acreage in this 142-acre tract. 
The issue presented to the trial court was the validity 
of certain conveyances of acreage in the aforementioned tract 
of real estate. The· first conveyance in question is a quit· 
claim deed dated March 17, 1977, and recorded in the office 
of the Utah County Recorder on May 3, 1977, as Entry Number 
13261 (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1), wherein Gold conveyed 
approximately 12-1/2 acres to Leo H. Bertagnole. The second 
conveyance in question was evidenced by a quit-claim deed 
dated Hay 3, 1977, and recorded in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder as Entry Number 13263 on May 3, 1977 (Defen-
dants' Exhibit Number 3), wherein Leo M. Bertagnole con-
veyed approximately 10 acres to Steven C. Davis and his wife, 
Kristi Davis. 
The final judgment of the trial court determined also 
the effect of a subsequent conveyance by Steven Davis and 
Kristi Davis of approximately 10 acres. This transaction 
appears in the record as a warranty deed executed May 2, 
1978, and recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder, 
Entry Number 23471, on June 15, 1978. (Defendants' Exhibit 
Number 2). The court also determined the effect of the 
quit-claim deed acknowledged April 4, 1977, and recorded 
May 3, 1977, in the office of the Utah County Recorder 
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where approximately 12-1/2 acres were conveyed by Steven c. 
Davis and Kristi Davis to Leo M. Bertagnole. 
Preliminary inquiry into the background of this law-
suit is essential. Hard feelings which culminated in this 
action arose between Verdi R. White, Sr., and Steven C. 
Davis in Harch, 1977, after Mr. White's return from a vaca-
tion. These hostilities were resultant from the senior 
Mr. White's categorization of Mr. Davis' activities during 
Mr. White's absence from the state. For reasons and by means 
irrelevant to this instant action, Hr. Davis had recorded 
a warranty deed from Gold to Steven C. Davis and Kristi 
Davis of approximately 142 acres in Utah County. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Humber 12). Previously, in December, 1976, Gold had 
obtained from Mack Jacobsen and E. D. Jacobsen an option 
agreement for the purchase of approximately 142 acres in Utah 
County, the subject property of the aforementioned deed. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 4). 
Upon learning of the above-described conveyance to Steven 
Davis and Kristi Davis, Mr. White, on behalf of Gold, is 
depicted as attempting to recover the property conveyed in 
the aforesaid warranty deed and to end the association with 
Mr. Davis. 
On March 16, 1977, defendant-appellant Davis and Verdi 
R. White, Sr., met in the offices of James B. Medlin, an 
attorney, in an attempt to reconcile their differences . 
. 3. 
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Resultant from this meeting was an agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Number 4) wherein Steven C. Davis was given until 
5:00 p.m., March 18, 1977, to consurmnate the negotiations 
currently in progress with Leo 11. Bertagnole for the pur-
chase of approximately 12-1/2 acres in Utah County. Further-
more, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations with 
Mr. Bertagnole, Steven Davis and Kristi Davis were to 
reconvey to Gold the entire Salem Hills acreage which Gold 
had acquired from Mack and E. D. Jacobsen. 
The Salem Hills property was duly reconveyed to Gold 
and was not a matter in controversy at trial. 
However, the negotiations between Steven C. Davis and 
Verdi R. White, Sr., Verdi R. White II, Fred Mowrey, James 
Medlin, and Leo U. Bertagnole on March 17 and March 18, 1977, 
were the subject of the instant trial. 
Defendant-appellant Davis and defendant Leo M. Bertagnole 
maintained that all concerned parties had agreed on March 18, 
1977, that Leo M. Bertagnole would purchase the acreage in 
question for $10,000. The defendants further contended that 
the documentary proof of this consummated transaction is 
evidenced by an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase 
(Defendants' Exhibit Number 5), a check for the consideration 
price stated in the earnest money receipt and offer to pur-
chase (Defendants' Exhibit Number 6), and a warranty deed 
from Gold to Leo M. Bertagnole (Defendants' Exhibit Number 
1). 
.4. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The plaintiff asserted at trial that, in accordance 
with the agreement prepared by Mr. Medlin (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Number 4) and a letter from Verdi R. White, Sr., 
to Leo M. Bertagnole dated March 17, 1977 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Humber 10), the negotiations for the purchase of the 
12-1/2 acres in Salem Hills was never consummated. The 
plaintiff further contended that the four deeds described 
earlier evidencing various interests in this parcel of land 
were invalid and defective. 
The trial court found that there may have been a con-
ditional delivery of the deed from Gold to Leo Bertagnole 
but that the stated conditions were not met and thus the 
deeds in question were void of any legal force and effect. 
Defendant-appellant Davis believes that the trial court 
erroneously decided that the deed from Gold to Leo Bertagnole 
was conditionally delivered, that the conditions were never 
fully complied with, and that the deeds from Leo Bertagnole 
to Steven Davis and Kristi Davis and from Steven Davis, 
Kristi Davis, and Wade Davis and the deed from Steven C. 
Davis and Kristi Davis to Leo Bertagnole were null and void. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COURT 
Trial in this matter was held on April 2, 1979, in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. 
On April 12, 1979, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, 
judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
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Utah, found that the delivery of a quit-claim deed to 
defendant Leo M. Bertagnole was conditional. 
Furthermore, Judge Bullock found that the conditions 
necessary to effectuate a valid absolute delivery to defen-
dant Leo 11. Bertagnole had never been performed. 
Lastly, the trial judge voided all subsequent convey-
ances of the subject property by defendant Leo Bertagnole 
and his grantees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defer.dant-appellant Steven C. Davis seeks to have the 
lower court's decision reversed as a matter of law; in the 
alternative, the defendant-appellant seeks to have this 
court remand the matter to the lower court for a factual 
hearing on the merits of this case. 
FIRST ARGUMENT 
DID THE PLAINTIFF SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN 
OF PROOF AT TRIAL? 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT ANS'\-illRS "YES." 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ANSWERS "NO." 
Parenthetical references found in the body of this brief 
are abbreviated so that "T" refers to testimony recorded in 
the trial transcript at the pages designated. 
Defendant-appellant's initial argument, that the plain-
tiff did not sustain its burden of proof at the trial, is 
delineated into the following three distinct points: 
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1. That the findings of the lower court are not 
supported by competent evidence. 
2. That much of the testimony and evidence pre-
sented at trial had no probative value in determining 
a central issue in dispute, as it dealt with matters 
remote in time; and 
3. That the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings made by the trial court. 
Each of these points are addressed below in the order ros-
tered above. 
The trial court concluded that "at best, there was a 
conditional delivery" and that the recorded deeds had no 
legal force and effect as the conditions precedent to a 
valid delivery thereof were never satisfied. (Tl66, Tl67). 
Determination of whether there was an absolute delivery 
or conditional delivery of the quit-claim deed from the 
plaintiff-respondent to Leo M. Bertagnole (Defendants' 
Exhibit Number 1) was premised upon testimony of Verdi R. 
vfuite, Sr. (Tl6, Tl7, Tl8, T25, T26), Fred Mowrey (T44), 
Steven Davis (T80, T81, T83), and Leo M. Bertagnole (Tl06) 
and a carbon copy of a letter purporting to state specified 
conditions precedent to the consummation of the conveyance 
of real estate to Leo U. Bertagnole. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
Number 10). 
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Verdi R. White, Sr., testified at trial (T26) that the 
letter containing escrow instructions (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
Number 10) was dictated by him to Steve Davis. However, 
Mr. White could not recall affixing his signature to this 
document (T26). The original letter was not produced at 
trial, and Mr. White's signature on this letter (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Number 10) cannot be proven or disproven. There-
fore, the assumption of the trial court that Mr. White did 
commit himself, by the physical act of signing his name, to 
the stated principles and intentions is logically faulty and 
subject to great non-persuasion and disbelief. There was 
no testimony from any other witness that would categorically 
affix Mr. White's signature to this document (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Number 10) and which would support the findings of 
the trial court. 
Absent competent testimony that Mr. White did sign the 
document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10), a reasonable belief 
that Mr. White did not intend to impose the conditions ex-
pressed within the document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Nu.mber 10) 
upon the negotiations for the sale of the 12-1/2 acres to 
Mr. Bertagnole should be sustained. Mr. White, Sr. , dictated 
the document's contents and was present when the document 
was drafted. Logic mandates that Mr. White, Sr. , would 
have immediately signed this letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
Number 10) if he were indeed attempting to impose the con-
ditions therein on these negotiations. Furthermore, it 
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is only logical that Hr. White, Sr. , would be able to recall 
signing this document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10). 
At trial, however, it was never demonstrated that 
Mr. White, Sr., signed the letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit Humber 
10) or even that he recalled doing so. It is defendant-
appellant Davis' contention that there is no competent 
testimony or evidence indicating that the letter was signed 
by Verdi R. Uhite, Sr. Certainly, if the person authorized 
to make business transactions and negotiations conditional 
fails to do so, it is neither within the prerogative or the 
ability of the trial judge to manufacture the existence of 
the conditions precedent. To blithely leap the parameters 
of logic and .reasonableness alters the complexion of the 
litigation before the court and manifestly prejudices the 
party against whom the assumed conditions are imposed. 
Substantiation that the .letter drafted March 17, 1977 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10), and the aforedescribed 
testimony relating to the contents therein are not competent 
evidence is found in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, Evidence, 
Section 2, at page 816: 
By "competent" evidence is meant that 
which the very nature of the thing to be 
proved requires as the fit and appropriate 
proof in the particular case. "Competent 
evidence" means evidence which tends to 
establish the fact in issue and does not 
rest on mere surmise or guess ... 
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Precendential case law from.this state's highest 
court also demands the introduction and consideration of 
competent evidence. 
An offer of proof must be certain, 
sufficient, and intelligible and must 
definitely state the facts sought to be 
proved. It must show the materiality, 
competency, and relevancy of the evidence 
offered. Dansak v. Deluke, 12 Utah 2d 
302, 366 P.2d 67, 70 (1961). 
Conjecture of the purest form and testimonial extrap-
olation premised upon surmise and guess were proferred to 
prove that Verdi R. White, Sr., did affix his name to the 
letter drafted March 17, 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 
10), and that the negotiations for the sale of the Salem 
Hills property was structured by conditions precedent. Such 
evidentiary offerings are clearly beyond the realm of com-
petent evidence and must be found inadmissible. Dansak, 
supra. 
Clearly, the assumption by the trial judge that the 
sale of the parcel of property in Salem Hills to Leo 
Bertagnole was conditional merely because several parties 
to the transaction were involved in the drafting of a letter 
detailing a future desire to impose conditions upon the 
transaction is erroneous and constitutes patently harmful 
error to the defendant-appellant Davis. 
The above-complained of asslll!lption by the trial judge 
manifestly falls within the test utilized by the Supreme 
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court of Utah in Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 236, 495 
P.2d 811 (1972), to determine if reversible error was com-
mitted. The court stated at page 814: 
To be considered along with the fore-
going is this further proposition relative 
to errors which are assigned in attempting 
to reverse a judgment: the inquiry is not 
merely whether some error may have been com-
mitted. It. is whether there was any error 
of a sufficient nature that it is reason-
able to believe that it adversely affected 
the appellant or deprived him of a fair 
trial in such a way that in the absence of 
such error there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the outcome would have been different. 
Certainly, the erroneous categorization of the delivery 
of the quit-claim deed to Leo Bertagnole (Defendants' 
Exhibit Number 1) as being conditional rather than absolute 
altered the probable outcome of this litigation. Furthermore, 
the erroneous characterization which was formulated upon a 
faulty assumption premised upon non-persuasive testimony 
is so egregious to defendant-appellant Davis that reversal 
of the lower court's findings is the only mandated course 
of action. 
In conjunction with the testimony of Verdi R. White, 
Sr. (Tl6, Tl 7, TlS, T25, T26), Fred Mowrey (T44, TSO, T81), 
Steven Davis (TSO, T83), and Leo Bertagnole (Tl06) regarding 
the contents of the letter of Har ch 17, 1977 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Number 10), the court utilized the document 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) to substantiate its findings 
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that the delivery of the quit-claim deed to Leo Bertagnole 
was conditional. 
The document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) is not 
competent, admissible evidence and should not have been given 
significant credibility by the trial court. Counsel for 
the defendant-appellant Steven Davis objected at trial (Tl7) 
that the letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) was violative 
of the original document or "best evidence" rule. 
McCormick, in his book, The Handbook Law of Evidence, 
1954, at page 409, defines this rule in the following manner: 
The specific tenor of this requirement 
needs to be definitely stated and its limits 
clearly understood. The rule is this: in 
providing the terms of a writing, where such 
terms are material, the original writing must 
be produced unless it is shown to be unavail-
able for some reason other than the serious 
fault of the proponent. 
Among the policy reasons given for this rule, Professor 
McCormick, supra, cites a rationale that is explicitly 
appropriate to this cause of action: 
The policy justification for the rule 
preferring the original writing lies in the 
fact (a) that precision in presenting to 
the court the exact words of the writing is 
of more than average importance, particularly 
as respects operative or dispositive instru-
ments, such as deeds, wills, and contracts, 
since a slight variation in words may mean 
a great difference in rights .... 
McCormick, supra, at page 410. 
At trial conclusive substantiation that the negotia-
tions with defendant Bertagnole were conditional were 
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almost exclusively dependent upon a carbon copy of the letter 
drafted March 17, 1977. (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10). 
No viable explanation was proferred at trial which accounted 
for the absence of the original letter. 
It is not the author's intent to suggest that there 
were any alterations made. In large part, the "best evi-
dence" rule was promulgated to prevent the introduction and 
utilization of untrustworthy evidence at trial. However, 
the point cannot too strongly be made that the original 
letter was not produced at trial nor was there any accounting 
made for the non-availability of the original. Essentially 
no precautions were taken to assure that altered evidence 
was not before the court for consideration. 
Furthermore, the carbon copy of the letter (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Number 10) was improperly admitted into evidence. 
Assuming that this document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) 
is secondary evidence, the uncontroverted reality is that 
the exhibit was accepted in evidence in total absence of 
a foundation for its admissibility being laid. 32 Corpus 
Juris Secundum, Evidence, Section 882, page 163. Stevens 
v. Gray, 259 P.2d 889 (1953). 
This piece of evidence (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) 
is violative of the "best evidence" rule. Furthermore, 
justification for the submission of a copy was never ten-
dered, nor was there any attempt made to lay a foundation 
.13. 
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for its acceptance as secondary evide~ce. ~ata!ly defec-
tive for so cany reasons, it (Plaintiff's :C:x'.-.i"::iit ::c.::-.)e::-
10) should never have been a detercinati~e factor in the 
resolution of this action. 
Equally significant and deserving of careful atten-
tion is the intended utilization of t~is carbon copy. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit ~~u;::ber 10). A.-iy credence .;iven to t::e 
contents of the letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit ::u=':Jer 2.0) 
significantly changes the legal r::eaning of not or:ly the 
quit-claic deed fron plaintiff-respondent to defendant 
Bertagnole (Defendants' Exhibit :iu=ber 1) but also all st:"::-
sequent conveyances such as that fro:::i de£er:cant Berta.g:-.o:'..e 
to defendant-appellant Davis. (Plaintiff's Exhi':Ji t :·:c.:."":"::er 
3). 
This legal ceta::;:orphosis ;.;as acco:::plis'.led in di~-ect 
contravention of the ancient sagagious r;::andate that a deec 
must be construed as any other docu:::ent, that is "::iy fi:-st 
refering to the four corners of the instru:::ent itself. 
The conveyance fro;:; pla.intiff-responcient to defenda:-:t 
Leo Bertagnole ~as effectuated by a quit-claic deed that 
is absolute on its face. (Defendar..ts' Ex'.-libit ::ur:ber 10). 
Like~ise, there are no expressed conditions ap?earing on 
the conveyance free defendant Bertagnole to defendant-
appellant Davis. (Plaintiff's [Xi'tibit ::u=ber 3). 
It is incu=:bent that the granter clearl:.: evidences 
his intent whenever appropriate. \'erdi :K. ~-:1iite, Sr., 
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~ac a=ple O?portunity to ensure that language making the 
conveyance to Leo Bertagnole (Defendant Exhibit Humber 
1) conditional appear on the face of this instruwent. 
(Jefe:-icants' Ex'.-.ibit lill!2ber 1). 
\·;':-iether this ele2entary precaution was intentionally or 
:.:nir-,tentior-.ally neglected is of no legal consectuence. The 
::::::-.\·eyance =ro::: plaintiff-respondent to defendant Bertagnole 
a:-.ci all subsec:uent transfers involving the Salerri Hills prop-
erty and the parties to this action nust be proclaimed valid. 
~~;:-.e:-e construction of a deed is necessary to deten:i.ine an 
incivid~al's interest in real property, the deed is con-
s:rued in favor of the grantee and in favor of vesting 
:itle. 4 Tiffany Real Propertv, Section 978. aeagher v. 
Cinta~ Gas Co., 225 P.2d 989 (Utah 1953). 
Judicial adherence to the above-stated proposition by 
:::-te Suprer::e Court of Utah is also found in Wood v. Ashby, 
253 P.2d 351 (1953), at page 353: 
It is generally concluded that a deed 
is to be construed most strongly against 
the gra:itor and r::ost fa\·orably to the grantee. 
(Citations in text onitted.) It is also con-
strued that in this state that a deed should 
be construed so as to effectuate the inten-
tions a:-ic desi:-es of the uarties, as cani-
fested bv the language cade use of in the 
deed. (Citations in text oBitted; emphasis 
added by author.) 
!he language "hereby quit-claics" found in the deed 
:re= the plaintiff-respondent to the defendant Leo Bertagnole 
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(Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) indicates a contemporaneous 
desire to effectuate the conveyances to defendant Bertagnole. 
Adherence to the language of present intent utilized by the 
plaintiff-respondent and the axiomatic proposition con-
struing a deed in favor of the grantee is resultant in a 
valid conveyance from plaintiff-respondent to defendant 
Bertagnole. 
In a decision that was grieviously erroneous and sin-
gularly prone to disdain the "best evidence" rule and case 
law precedent from this jurisdiction, the trial court 
declared invalid the interests of defendant Bertagnole and 
defendant-appellant Davis to the property in Salem Hills 
because certain conditions precedent were not met. A 
judicially proper deternination of defendant-appellant 
Davis' interest in the ten acre parcel of land in Salem 
Hills is possible only by a reversal of the lower court's 
decision. 
The action initiated by the plaintiff-respondent 
focused upon the rightful ownership of approximately 12-1/2 
acres of real property in the Salem Hills area of Utah 
County. 
As evidenced by the matters specifically rostered in 
its complaint, the plaintiff-respondent petitioned the court 
to consider and arbitrate only those transactions involving 
the parties named in this action and the conveyance of 
this acreage in Salem Hills . 
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Indeed, the issue presented to the court was not 
overly complex in substance or chronological occurrences. 
However simple the issue central to this action, 
presentation of the plaintiff-respondent's prima facie case 
was notable for the inordinate amount of time devoted to 
the presentation of testimony and evidence utterly lacking 
in probative value essential to deciding it. 
Nearly all of this cumbersome testimony and evidence 
dealt with events preceding the negotiations between the 
parties to this suit for the divesture of the 12-1/2 acres 
from plaintiff-respondent. 
Every witness who testified at trial was requested 
or allowed to explain their particular knowledge of the 
development of the Sale~ Hills area in Utah County and the 
business associations between the parties involved in this 
action. Verdi R. White, Sr. (T7, T8, T9, TlO, TU, T24, 
T30, Tl28, Tl29); Fred Mowrey (T35, T36, T37, T38, T39, 
T42, T46, T47, T48, T49); Steven C. Davis (T52, T53, T54, 
T45, T57, T58, T59, T60, T61, T62, T63, T64, T65, T66, 
T67, T69, T70, T71, T72, T73, T75, T76, T77, T92, Tl37, 
' Tl38, Tl44); Leo M. Bertagnole (TlOl, Tl02, Tl03, Tl04, 
TlOS, Tlll, Tll3, Tll4). 
Inquiring into the above-described matters was not 
conducive to a judicial pronouncement characterized by 
its unwavering impartiality or intelligibleness. 
Nearly every corrnnunication detailing the background 
of this action was irrelevant and immaterial. Dansak, 
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supra. Such digressions should have been quickly halted. 
Each item of documentary evidence explaining historical 
matters preceding this action, such as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
Number 9, dealt with matters collatera.l to the primary 
subject of this action and was totally void of any proba-
tive value. 
Much of these incidental offerings of background data 
were unsympathetic and prejudicial to defendant-appellant 
Davis' posture before the court. Note the judge's charac-
terization of the proceedings as "argumentative." (T67). 
Additionally, the effect of this cumulative, non-
probative testimony was to confuse the attorneys and the judge 
Note the court's difficulty in relating the testimony being 
given and the subject matter of this litigation. "How 
do you get to the 12-1/2 acres?" (T62) "I think that is 
true, Hr. White. I have difficulty in relating it to the 
12-1/2 acres that I thought was the subject of this lawsuit." 
(T68). 
The defendant-appellant Steven Davis is mindful and 
appreciative of the effort evidenced by the trial court to 
comprehend the issues presented at trial and to relate the 
testimony offered in court to the subject matter of the 
lawsuit. No fault may be found with the trial court's 
attentiveness at trial. 
The matter of particular concern to defendant-appellant 
Davis is that numerous matters which were not germane to 
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the central issue were allowed to obliterate the issue at 
hand and possibly preclude a clear and fair consideration 
of the merits of this litigation. Thus, the defendant-
appellant petitions this court to reverse the decision of 
the lower court or to remand the matter for retrial without 
the taint of the aforedescribed irrelevant matters. 
Testimony from several witnesses clearly indicated 
that the plaintiff-respondent was amendable to the purchase 
of the option for the 12-1/2 acres by Leo Bertagnole for 
the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Steven Davis 
stated that Verdi R. ·white, Sr., and other associates of 
the plaintiff-respondent were present in Leo Bertagnole's 
office and uttered no objections when the purchase price 
of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for the option on the 
12-1/2 acres was agreed upon. (T76, T77, T78, T79, T80, 
T90, T96, Tl35). Leo Bertagnole also testified that all 
the parties involved were reconciled to the purchase price 
of ten thousand dollars ($10, 000). (Tl05, Tl09. T118, T119, 
Tl20, Tl21). Fred Mowrey testified that Verdi R. White was 
present during the negotiations for the purchase price 
but left before the earnest money agreement was drawn up. 
(Defendants' Exhibit Number 5). (T49). 
On Harch 13, 1977, subsequent to the agreement that 
Leo Bertagnole was to purchase the option for the 12-1/2 
acres for the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), an 
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earnest money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5-) was 
drafted. This earnest money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit 
Number 5) is signed by Leo Bertagnole and defendant-appellant 
Davis. 
The stated consideration of one hundred dollars ($100) 
(Defendants' Exhibit Number 5) was paid to Jim Medlin, an 
attorney who was acting as an agent for both Verdi R. '\Jhite, 
Sr., the plaintiff-respondent's president, and Steven 
Davis, the defendant-appellant. (Defendants' Exhibit Number 
6). (Tl09, TllO). 
Upon execution of the earnest money agreement (Defen-
dants' Exhibit Number 5), Leo Bertagnole was given a quit-
claim deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1). This quit-claim 
deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) was prepared in the 
office of l1r. Bertagnole. 
Jim Medlin was an attorney who was openly representing 
Verdi R. White, Sr. , the president of plaintiff-respondent, 
and defendant-appellant Steve Davis. During the two-day 
period that negotiations for a mutually agreeable purchase 
price were being conducted, Mr. Medlin was vested with the 
ostensible authority to bind the plaintiff-respondent. To 
argue that he could not bind the plaintiff-respondent is 
a non-meritorious, untenable position. Restatement of 
Agency, 2d, Section 170. 
Numerous decisions from the Supreme Court of this 
state support the proposition that the principal will be 
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bound by the acts of his agent. B and R Supply Company v. 
Q£inghurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Skerl v. 
Uillow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah 472, 69 P.2d 502 (1973); 
Santi V. Denver and Rio Grand He stern Railroad Company, 21 
Utah 2d 155, 442 P.2d 921 (1968). 
However, we recognize that there may 
be circumstances created by the principal, 
or for which it is responsible, and upon 
which a third party reasonably can and 
does rely, and in which instance the 
principal may be bound by the representa-
tion made. Santi, supra. 
Clearly, Verdi R. White, Sr., was instrumental in 
catalyzing the manner and method by which the negotiations 
with the defendant Bertagnole were conducted. Likewise, 
the plaintiff-respondent is bound by the agent Medlin' s 
acceptance of the ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as the 
purchase price, the one hundred dollar ($100) considera-
tion, and the executed earnest money agreement. (Defen-
dants I Exhibit number 5). 
Shortly thereafter, defendant-appellant Steve Davis 
and Kristi Davis conveyed their interest in this property 
to Kristi Davis and Wade Davis. (Qefendants' Exhibit 
Number 2). This deed was also recorded. 
The evidence presented at trial to document the pur-
chase price that was acquiesced to by all the concerned 
parties, the valid delivery and recordation of each con-
veyance undeniably preponderates and overwhelms any evi-
dence attempting to pr.ave the antithesis of the above . 
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There can be no defensible argument that the trial 
court's decision is correct. Significant evidence of 
considerable quantity and quality substantiates a conclu-
sion totally antithetical to that of the trial court. 
In the time honored and universally 
accepted rule that a finding or verdict 
must be supported by sustantial evidence, 
the modifying objective "substantial" has 
been used advisedly to indicate a higher 
degree of proof than just any evidence 
of any kind. The requirement is that the 
evidence must be sufficient in amount and 
credibility that, when considered in con-
nection with the other evidence and circum-
stances shown in the case, would justify 
some, but not necessarily all, reasonable 
minds acting fairly thereon, to believe it 
to be truth. And conversely, if when 
so considered, the court is convinced 
that it is so inconsequential, or so 
clearly lacking in credibility, that no 
jury acting fairly and reasonably could 
so believe, it cannot properly be regarded 
as substantial evidence. Utah State Road 
Commission v. Steele Ranch, 533 P. 2d 838 
(1975) at page 890. 
The testimony of the witnesses Mowrey, Bertagnole, 
and Davis paralleled and corroborated that of one 
another for the most part. Even where there are dif-
ferent recollections of events or discrepancies, they are 
minor. 
Defendant Bertagnole's interest in the 12-1/2 acres 
in Utah County was filed and recorded. The quit-claim 
deed which evidences his interest in the property (Defen-
dants' Exhibit Number 1) is not apparently conditional, 
nor are the recorded conveyances to defendant-appellants 
Steven Davis, Kristi Ann Davis, and Hade Davis . 
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Reason and logic dictate the correct conclusion that 
there was a valid delivery and conveyance of the involved 
acreage to the defendant Bertagnole and the defendant-
appellant herein. 
The determination made by the trial court as the fact 
finder in this instance is flagrantly erroneous. Careful 
examination of the relevant facts, testimony, and evidence 
permits no other conclusion. Incapable of being supported 
by the record in this matter ci.nd unabashedly pejorative of 
the interests of the defendant-appellant Davis, the lower 
court's decision must be reversed. 
SECOND ARGUMENT 
WAS THERE A VALID DELIVERY OF THE 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED FROM GOLD OIL LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION TO LEO M. 
BERTAGNOLE? 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ANSWERS "YES." 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO." 
Defendant-appellant Davis contends that the decision of 
the lower court must be reversed as it is in absolute, 
direct contravention of the judicial precedent found in this 
state and numerous other jurisdictions. 
Sagacious adherence to the legal axiom that a decision 
of a lower court will not be disturbed except for reasons 
judicially sanctioned is abundant in the case law of this 
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jurisdiction. Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28 Ut~ 
2d 368, 603 P.2d 137 (1972). Utah State Road Commission 
v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (1975). Branch v. Western 
Factors, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 361, 502 P.2d 570 (1972). 
However, as is noted in Elton, ~upra, and !-lardy v. 
Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972), a manifest 
misapplication of the law by rhe trial court requires a 
reversal of the lower court's decision. 
On appeal, the evidence is viewed 
in the light most favorable to sustain 
the lower court, and the findings will 
not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence or it 
manifestly appears that the court mis-
applied the law to the established 
facts. Hardy, supra, at pages 29 and 30 
(citations in text omitted). 
It should also be noted that, in this instance, the 
decision of the lower court is not to be cloaked with any 
presumption of accuracy as the subject matter of this appeal 
dictates that the defendant-appellant be given a trial de 
novo by this court. 
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, 
that this action to avoid deeds is one 
in equity upon which thi$ court has both 
the prerogative and the duty to review 
and weigh the evidence and to determine 
the facts. Del Porto, supra, page 812. 
Adhering to this tenor of a judicially sanctioned trial 
de ~. the Utah Supreme Court, in Lake v. Hermes Associa~, 
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552 P.2d 126 (1976), delineated its task of interpreting the 
documentary evidence admitted at trial. 
The defendant places reliance on 
the standard presumption of credibility 
and verity to be accorded the findings 
and judgment of the trial court. However, 
in a case of this nature, where the reso-
lution of the controversy depends on the 
meaning to be given documents, the trial 
court is in no more favored position and 
is no better able to determine the meaning 
of such documents than is this court. 
Therefore, as to such an issue, those 
presumptions do not apply. ~ake, supra, 
at 128. 
The contention of the defendant-appellant Davis that 
the lower court erroneously applied the controlling law to 
this cause of action is premised upon a dual-pronged argu-
ment. First, defendant-appellant Davis maintains that the 
earnest money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5) 
embodies all the terms relevant to the conveyance of prop-
erty by the plaintiff-respondent to defendant Leo Bertagnole. 
The earnest money receipt (Defendants' Exhibit Number 
5) was drafted on March 18, 1977 (T42, T45, T76, T77, T78, 
Tl09, TllO, Tll9), one day antecedent to the letter of 
l!arch 17, 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) (Tl6, Tl7, 
T25, T26, TSO, T90, Tl33). 
state: 
Lines 41 and 42 of the earnest money agreement 
It is understood and agreed that 
the terms written in this receipt con-
stitute the entire preliminary contract 
between the purchaser and seller and 
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that no verbal statement made by anyone 
relative to this transaction shall be 
construed to be a part of this trans-
action unless incorporated in writin~ 
herein . . 0 
Thus, the terms of the letter dated March 17, 1977 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10), were extinguished and 
merged into the terms contained within the earnest money 
agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5). Stubbs v. 
Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977); Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 
862 (Utah 1973); Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1978). 
As noted by the court in Stubbs, supra, collateral acts 
which are to be performed by a party will not be excused by 
application of the principle of merger. 
However, there are no collateral acts mandated by this 
letter. (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10). 
Thus, the terms, spirit, and intent of this letter 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) were merged into the earnest 
money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5) and forever 
put to rest. Plaintiff-respondent's attempts to revive the 
letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) amount to little more 
than futile attempts to permeate a legal barrier premised 
upon sound legal rationale and fortified by unswerving 
judicial adherence. 
Defendant Bertagnole was vested with title to the 
property in Salem Hills when the quit-claim deed (Defen-
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dants' Exhibit Humber 11), absolute on its face, was -delivered 
to him. 
Furthermore, like any other property owner, he was able 
to divest himself of this property at his will for terms 
acceptable to him. This is precisely what he did a short 
time after the quit-claim deed to him from plaintiff-
respondent (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) was recorded in 
Utah County. His grantees are Steven C. Davis and Kristi 
Ann Davis. A duly-recorded quit-claim deed (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Number 3) conveys ten acres of property in Salem 
Hills to them. Steven Davis and Kristi Davis subsequently 
conveyed their interest in this property to Wade Davis and 
Kristi Davis. (Defendants' Exhibit Number 2). This deed 
was also recorded. Each of these individuals should be 
recognized as the owners of their respective parcels of 
property. Reversal of the lower court's decision is fund-
amental to a sound resolution of this action not only 
because of the trial court's erroneous categorization of the 
documentary evidence but also because it is in irreconcilable 
juxtaposition with the law applicable to this action. 
Defendant-appellant Davis' second argument is that 
there was an unconditional delivery of the quit-claim deed 
to defendant Bertagnole. (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1). 
26 Corpus Juris Secundum, Deeds, Section 48, relates 
the general rule that a validly delivered deed that is void 
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of any express conditions will pass absolute title to the 
grantee. 
As a general rule, a delivery of a 
deed must be absolute and unconditional 
unless it is in escrow. Further, as 
appears in Escrows, Section 7, as a 
general rule, a delivery in escrow may 
be made only to a third person not a 
party to the transaction, and there can 
be no such delivery to the grantee on a 
condition not expressed in the instru-
ment. Accordingly, while there is some 
authority to the contrary, it is generally 
held that delivery to the grantee of a 
deed absolute on its face will pass 
complete title to him regardless of any 
condition or contingency on which its 
operative effect is made to depend, 
provided, of course, there is otherwise 
a sufficient delivery under the rules 
stated supra, Sections 41-47, without 
reservation of control or dominion over 
the deed by the grantor. To thus vest 
complete title in the grantee, however, 
it is essential that it shall be the 
intention of the grantor that the instru-
ment shall become operative, without 
further act on his part, on performance 
of the condition, and the rule applies 
only to those deeds which are on their 
face complete contracts, requiring 
nothing but delivery to make them per-
fect, and does not apply to those which 
on their face import that something 
besides delivery is necessary to be done 
in order to make them complete. 26 
Corpus Juris Secundum, sup(a. See also 
6 Powell on Real Property 1977), Section 
897. 
The following discussion from 23 American Jurisprudence 
2d, Deeds, Section 92, is in accord with the above-stated 
axioms. 
From the general rule that is 
essential to an escrow that the instru-
ment be delivered to a stranger to the 
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instrument, the view evolved that a 
deed cannot be delivered in escrow to 
the grantee therein. Under this view, 
the effect of a direct delivery of a 
deed to the grantee cannot be obviated 
by the intention of the parties that it 
shall operate as an escrow; in other 
words, a deed delivered to the grantee 
with the understanding that it is not to 
be operative until some condition 
precedent shall have been performed by 
the grantee, or some contingency shall 
have happened, is fully operative, at 
least as between the grantor and an 
innocent purchaser, notwithstanding the 
condition is never performed or the 
contemplated event never happens. In 
such cases, the grantor, by the act of 
handing the deed to the grantee, in fact 
passes title to the grantee; to permit 
him to set up the condition by parol 
would contradict his deed, and hence, 
parol evidence as to such delivery or 
condition is inadmissible. 
From the facts presented at trial, it must be concluded 
that the delivery to defendant Bertagnole was sufficient to 
transfer title to him. The quit-claim deed conveying the 
property to defendant Bertagnole (Defendants' Exhibit Number 
1), written in the present tense, is unconditional in its 
terms. Furthermore, if the letter of March 17, 1977 (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit Number 10), is interpreted to signify a 
desire by Verdi Hhite, Sr., to pla~e the quit-claim deed in 
escrow, it must be noted that nothing in the trial record 
documents an attempt by the grantor to place the quit-claim 
deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) with Security Title 
Company, the named escrow agent . 
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However, the only method to determine if the delivery 
to defendant Bertagnole was conditional is precluded by 
judicial fact, as such investigation is violative of the 
parol evidence rule. 23 Am. Jur. 2d, supra. 
Thus, the proper conclusion is that title to this 
property was vested i_n defendant Bertagnole when the quit-
claim deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) was delivered to 
him. Verdi R. \mite's departure to record the deed from 
Steven Davis and Kristi Davis to the plaintiff-respondent 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit J:fomber 14) without further instructions 
to his agent, James Hedlin, is conclusively demonstrative of 
his intent to bind the plaintiff-respondent to the just 
concluded negotiations with defendant Bertagnole. (T28, 
T29, T45, T78, T79, Tll9). This, in the words of one very 
distinguished scholar, is sufficient to construe the intent 
of the grantor to make a valid delivery on the deed. 
8 Thompson on Real Property (1963), Section 4227. 
Furthermore, the grantees of defendant Bertagnole, 
Steven Davis and Kristi Davis, were in actuality vested with 
title to the property conveyed to them by defendant Bertagnole 
(Defendants' Exhibit number 3). These conveyances evidenced 
by the following exhibits (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1, 
Defendants' Exhibit Number 2, and Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 
3) should be given unclouded legal cognizance . 
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Lastly, the plaintiff-respondent was not able to meet 
or properly rebut the presumption operative in this state 
that the recording of a deed is evidence of its delivery. 
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 355 (1934); 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 
P.2d 807 (1966). 
Furthermore, this presumption is to be rebutted by 
"clear and convincing evidence." Chamberlain, supra, and 
Controlled Receivables, Inc., supra. 
Both Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence 
2d maintain that the recording of a deed is factual proof of 
the absolute delivery of the deed. 26 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Deeds, Section 44; 23 American Jurisprudence 2d, Deeds, 
Section 94. 
As detailed in the trial proceedings, the plaintiff-
respondent relinquished the quit-claim deed to defendant 
Bertagnole, as grantee (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1), to 
their agents James Medlin and Steven C. Davis. Implicit in 
the agreement between Verdi R. White, Sr. , and Steven C. 
Davis (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 4) is the understanding 
' . 
that Steven C. Davis will undertake to consummate a sale of 
the 12 acres in Salem Hills as the agent for the plaintiff-
respondent. Explicit in this same agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Humber 4) and from the subsequent tenor of the 
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negotiations with the defendant Bertagnole is the status of 
James Medlin as an agent of the plaintiff-respondent . 
.. . Some courts hold that no intent 
to make delivery appears where the recorder 
was expressly instructed that the deed 
was to be delivered to the grantor, or the 
grantor's agent, but other courts recognize 
the presur11ption of delivery arising from 
the fact that the grantor caused the deed 
to be recorded even where the deed, after 
recording, was returned to the grantor ... 
23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, Section 94. 
The latter position is the one which has been adopted 
in this jurisdiction and several others. Chamberlain, 
supra; Controlled Receivables, Inc., supra; State, By Pai 
v. Thom, 563 P.2d 983 (1977); Takacs v. Takacs, 317 Mich. 
72, 26 N.W.2d 712 (1947); Dyer v. Skaden, 128 Mich. 348, 87 
N.W. 277 (1901); In Re Hume's Etate, 123 Mont. 223, 272 P.2d 
999 (1954). 
The rule seems to be well settled 
that a deed duly executed and acknow-
ledged and shown to be in the possession 
of the grantee is self-proving both as 
to execution and delivery, and that the 
recording of a deed is likewise evidence 
of delivery. Chamberlain, supra, at page 
361. 
To successfully defeat this presumption and annul the 
conveyances in question, the plaintiff had to meet its 
burden of proof with clear and convincing evidence. 
And not only is the burden of 
proving nondelivery upon the plaintiffs, 
but the inference of delivery arising 
from the possession of the deed by the 
grantee and from the recording thereof 
is entitled to great and controlling 
weight and can only be overcome by clear 
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and convincing evidence. Chamberlain, 
supra, at page 36. 
Or, as the court more recently stated: 
Of prime importance is the rule 
that one who asserts the invalidity of 
a deed must so prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The recording of a 
deed raises a presumption of delivery, 
which presumption is entitled to great 
and controlling weight and which can 
only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence. Controlled Receivables, Inc., 
supra, at page 809. 
The nature of evidence sufficient to overcome the 
presumption and validity of a recorded deed is detailed in 
23 Arn. Jur. 2d, Deeds, Section 126: 
When a presumption of a deed arises, 
nothing except the most satisfactory 
evidence of non-delivery can prevail 
against it; a mere preponderance of the 
evidence is not sufficient. 
At trial, Verdi R. White, Sr., made several admissions 
that he had delivered the deed to the agents, Steven Davis 
and James Medlin, who were authorized to negotiate the sale 
of the 12-1/2 acres to defendant Bertagnole. (Tl7, Tl8, 
Tl9, T20, T22, T27, T28). There was not a single allegation 
or an iota of proof at trial that the quit-claim deed (Defen-
dants' Exhibit Number 1) had not been given to an agent for 
delivery to the grantee upon the successful completion of 
the negotiations. 
Independant recollection from the defendant-appellant 
Davis (TSO, T31, T84, T85, T36, T87, Tl35, Tl36) and the 
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defendant Leo Bertagnole (Tl08, Tl22, Tl23) related that 
Verdi R. White, Sr., delivered the deed to an agent of the 
plaintiff-respondent. 
The admissions aforementioned by Verdi R. White, Sr., 
are significant. These admissions conclusively and thorough!:: 
defeat any claim by the plaintiff-respondent that there was 
no delivery of the quit-claim deed to defendant Leo Bertagnolt 
(Defendants' Exhibit Number 1). 
Furthermore, Mr. White's testimony alone is sufficient 
to permanently silence the allegations of the plaintiff-
respondent that the delivery was conditional. Counsel for 
the plaintiff-respondent asked Hr. White if he had ever 
authorized the delivery of the quit-claim deed (Defendants' 
Exhibit Number 1) to Mr. Bertagnole. He responded, "Only on 
the grounds that they complete the sale." (T20). 
Testimony, which has already been detailed elsewhere in 
this brief, places Hr. White in Mr. Bertagnole's office 
until some time after the purchase price for the property 
had been established. In other words, relinquishment of the 
deed by the president of the plaintiff-respondent did not 
occur until after he was satisfied that a valid purchase of 
the property had been made. 
Any assertion that there was a conditional delivery to 
defendant Leo Bertagnole is inherently affected with frailty 
that reasonably casts doubt upon its accuracy and truthfulness . 
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In addition, any allegation that there was no de.livery 
of the deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) is patently 
absurd. There was a total absence of proof to sustain this 
allegation. 
Furthermore, as discussed previously, the act of 
recording a deed creates a presumption of delivery in this 
state. Chamberlain, supra; Controlled Receivables, Inc., 
supra. 
The conveyance to Leo Bertagnole (Defendants' Exhibit 
!lumber 1) was recorded in Utah County on May 3, 1977. On 
this date, the conveyance of ten acres to Steven Davis and 
Kristi Ann Davis (Defendants' Exhibit Number 3) was also 
recorded. The conveyance to Hade Davis and Kristi Davis 
from Steve Davis and Kristi Davis (Defendants' Exhibit 
!lumber 2) was recorded on June 15, 1978. These conveyances 
are prima facie proof of title in the respective grantees 
and should be so recognized. 
There is no evidence, much less evidence of a clear and 
convincing nature, that dictates this annulment. However, 
there is araple authority that the decision of the trial 
court is an undeniable, unfortunate misapplication of the 
controlling law. Reason, logic, and equity dictate that the 
lower court's decision be reversed . 
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CONCLUSIOU 
The lower court erred in its finding that the delivery 
of a quit-claim deed for approximately 12-1/2 acres in Utah 
County to defendant Leo M. Bertagnole was conditional. 
Defendant-appellant Davis relies heavily upon this court's 
rulings in Chamberlain v. Larsen, supra, and Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, supra. The court's holdings 
in both of these cases are patently applicable in the in-
stant case. In each of the above-cited cases, the court 
maintained that the recording of a deed created a pre-
sumption of delivery which could only be rebutted by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
Elicited at trial was the fact that the plaintiff's 
president delivered the quit-claim deed naming defendant 
Bertagnole as the grantee to his agent after he and other 
representatives of the plaintiff were present during nego-
tiations for the purchase of this property. 
Competent documentary evidence to support the allega-
tions that there was a lack of delivery to defendant 
Bertagnole, or that any delivery to the defendant Bertagnole 
was conditional, was lacking. Competent testimony to 
support these allegations was also absent at trial. 
At trial, the plaintiff failed to present evidence of 
a sufficiently clear and convincing nature to rebut the 
presumption operative in this jurisdiction. A legally 
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correct decision would, therefore, have rejected the allega-
tions found in the plaintiff's complaint and denied them 
their requested relief. 
Denial of defendant-appellant Davis' appeal to vest 
title in the grantees of defendant Bertagnole and Steven C. 
Dav::.s would be a misapplication of the law applicable to 
this action and defeat justice. 
Wherefore, the defendant-appellant respectfully prays 
to have the lower court's order reversed as a matter of law; 
in the alternative, the defendant-appellant seeks to have 
this court vacate the lower court's decision and remand 
back for a factual hearing on the merits of this matter. 
DATED this c:;;. ~day of September, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Carolyn L. Driscoll and 
Nicolaas DeJonge 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant Davis 
By c:,~/ ,,Z £.~ Car~: Driscoll 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Defendant-Appellant Davis was served on counsel for the 
respondent, Woodrow D. White, 2121 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this <€ c;-;;_, day of September, 1979. 
~~-~ ~ ~=Y-car~L. Driscol 
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